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WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK 
ABOUT NEUTRALITY: 
A COMMENTARY ON THE SUSSKIND–
STULBERG DEBATE, 2011 EDITION 
BERNIE MAYER, PH.D.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
We have an incredible appetite for debating the role and meaning of 
neutrality in mediation.  Mediators seem to be fairly clear about how to 
handle neutrality in practice, but confused in theory.  That is, mediators 
are generally fairly clear about how to present their role, their 
commitment to impartiality, their structural independence, and the 
practical implications of how they define their role for how they 
approach their work.  But when we discuss how to conceptualize 
neutrality, when we consider how thorough our commitment to 
neutrality can be, and when we debate whether such a commitment is 
even appropriate, we are often confused, inconsistent, and divided.  
Something is going on here beyond the need to clarify our ethical stance 
and our commitment to our clients.  What does this discussion represent 
and what can we learn from this discussion about our identity as conflict 
professionals? 
Perhaps the most renowned representation of this discussion has 
been the exchange between Josh Stulberg and Larry Susskind.1  In their 
exchange, Susskind argued that mediators had a responsibility to insure 
that the outcome of mediation is fair and stable and that it lead to 
socially desirable outcomes and precedents.2  Stulberg responded that 
the mediator not only  had no such responsibility but also that any 
attempt to insure a desirable outcome would undercut the potential 
mediation offered to disputants and to society.3  As reported elsewhere 
 
* The Werner Institute, Creighton University. 
1. See generally Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to 
Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981); Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation 
and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
2. Susskind, supra note 1, at 13–18. 
3. Stulberg, supra note 1, at 86–87. 
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in this issue, Susskind and Stulberg revisited their classic discussion at a 
recent court-based-mediation conference held at Marquette University 
Law School in September 2011.4  I had the privilege of participating in 
this panel (moderated by John Lande5).  I was impressed by the shelf life 
of this discussion, by the continued influence of Susskind and Stulberg’s 
framing of the issue, and by their steadfastness in holding to pretty much 
the same positions that they articulated thirty years ago.  But I do not 
think that their framing of the issue gets to the core challenge that the 
discussion of neutrality suggests, and I believe that such framing is 
misleading in some important ways.  On one hand, mediators do not 
have the power to insure fair, stable, or socially desirable outcomes, and 
they generally do not have the power to prevent such outcomes either.6  
On the other hand, mediators often alter the power dynamics in 
negotiations.7  There is no such thing as a level playing field, and as a 
result, mediators always have an impact, which is not neutral, on the 
process and the outcome.8  Were we not to have such an impact, we 
would not be of much value and our help would not be sought.  The 
challenge is to be conscious, transparent, strategic, and wise in using our 
power to promote an ethical and constructive conflict engagement 
process. 
II.  WHAT DO WE MEAN BY NEUTRALITY? 
To get at this, let us first consider what we mean by neutrality.  
There are many definitions of neutrality—and almost equally as many 
critiques of these definitions, especially as applied to the role of 
mediation.9  As I see it, neutrality as applied to mediation is composed 
of several different and sometimes contradictory elements.  These 
 
4. See generally Panel Discussion, Core Values of Dispute Resolution: Is Neutrality 
Necessary?, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 805 (2012). 
5. John Lande is the Isidor Loeb Professor and Former Director of the LL.M. Program 
in Dispute Resolution at the University of Missouri School of Law. 
6. See BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 141 (2004) [hereinafter MAYER 2004] (arguing that mediators offer 
unrealistic guarantees to parties in a dispute, such as neutrality and equality). 
7. See id. at 142–43. 
8. Id. at 141–44. 
9. See, e.g., Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality 
in Mediation, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 35 (1991); Kevin Gibson et al., Shortcomings of 
Neutrality in Mediation: Solutions Based on Rationality, 12 NEGOT. J. 69 (1996); Rachael 
Field, Neutrality and Power: Myths and Reality, ADR BULL. (Bond Univ. Dispute Resol. Ctr., 
Robina, Queensland, Austl.), May/June 2000, at 16. 
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include structure, behavior, emotion, perception, and intention.  The 
structural element is about connection and conflict of interest.  Are we 
connected by history, relationships, culture, gender, ethnicity, or in some 
other way to one or more of the parties to a dispute?  Will we benefit in 
some significant way by a particular kind of outcome?  Structural 
challenges to neutrality are sometimes obvious.  If I am mediating an 
employment dispute related to a proposed termination of an employee 
and if I may be offered that same job if the termination goes through, no 
matter how fair-minded I am, I am not neutral.  If I am mediating the 
divorce of a niece, I am not neutral.  If I own shares in a company that is 
a party to a dispute I am asked to mediate, I am not neutral (at least in a 
structural sense). 
Sometimes, the structural challenges are subtler.  If I have been 
engaged to mediate disputes in which one of the parties is represented 
by a large and influential law firm with whom I have frequently worked, 
whereas the other side is represented by a small, struggling firm with 
whom I have never worked before and am unlikely to work with again, 
then there is a significant structural challenge to my neutrality.  I 
potentially stand to lose an important source of referrals if I alienate one 
side, whereas the consequences of alienating the other side are minimal.  
But if we never take on cases where there is any potential challenge to 
our structural neutrality, then our scope of practice would be very 
limited, particularly if we work in small communities. 
Connections abound in our lives.  And clients often want us because 
they have heard of us or previously worked with us.  When are the 
structural challenges to our neutrality so great that we need to recuse 
ourselves from a particular case, no matter how convinced we are that 
we can act in a fair and constructive way?  There are plenty of answers 
to this question in different codes of professional conduct, but the 
bottom line seems to be that we should be transparent about our 
connections and exercise judgment about when we cannot ethically act 
as a third party.  In other words, the boundaries of appropriate behavior 
are not clear. 
Neutrality as behavior has to do with what we actually do that might 
favor one party at the expense of another party.  Some behaviors are 
clearly gross breaches of neutrality, for example, when we reveal to one 
side what the undisclosed bottom line of another side might be or when 
we openly take sides on a contentious issue.  But when we avoid eye 
contact with one party, allow one party to speak at far greater length 
than another, or focus on a subject that is important to one party but not 
on an issue that is important to another party, we are also behaving in a 
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way that is not neutral—that is, we are acting in a way that promotes the 
interests of one party over another party. 
Of course, there is no way to avoid this situation entirely.  Anything 
we do—or don’t do—has an impact and often a differential impact on 
the parties involved.  If we were to be so guarded in our behavior so as 
to absolutely minimize the potential of having such an impact, we would 
severely limit our ability to be effective.  We are expected to prevent 
one party from dominating or intimidating another, to see to it that all 
relevant issues are addressed, to try to insure that each party has the 
opportunity to articulate their concerns, and to have their questions 
addressed.  While these may seem like neutral actions, they often occur 
under circumstances when one party is more powerful or competent at 
negotiation than another, and our interventions, therefore, have the 
effect of empowering the less powerful party to some degree at the 
expense of the more powerful party.  We can try to justify such an 
intervention by arguing that in the end this benefits everyone, but this is 
not always the case.  Sometimes the more powerful party would do 
better, at least by their own standards, if we were to play a more passive 
role.  At other times, we may actually advance the cause of the more 
powerful party by trying to adhere to a more neutral role.  In a sense, 
our very attempt to be neutral is sometimes the source of non-neutral 
behavior.  In other words, complete behavioral neutrality is not an 
option.  All playing fields advantage some parties more than others, and 
all interventions or actions do the same. 
Emotional neutrality, which is sometimes referred to as impartiality 
or lack of bias, is even more difficult to monitor.10  Part of what allows us 
to be effective involves our connecting with parties emotionally and 
being empathetic.  We naturally have feelings about the situations and 
the parties—sometimes stronger, sometimes less so—and sometimes we 
have positive feelings toward one party and negative feelings toward 
another.  We also find ourselves mediating issues about which we have 
strong opinions.  For example, divorce mediators have all experienced 
cases where agreements were reached about the care of children that 
are not what we consider to be the best for the children or the families. 
If I had to step aside from acting as a mediator every time I found 
myself more sympathetic toward one side than another or in 
disagreement in some way with the outcome emerging from the process, 
 
10. See MAYER 2004, supra note 6, at 17, 29–30; CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE & PETER J. 
WOODROW, HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL AND MULTICULTURAL NEGOTIATION 419 (2010). 
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I would find myself without much work.  It may be that I like one party 
more than another, that I am more concerned about that party’s 
circumstances, that I can empathize with that party’s point of view, or 
that I agree with that party’s arguments.  This does not mean that I 
express these thoughts openly or directly or that I act on them.  But, 
nonetheless, they are there, and it is likely that I will be better able to 
monitor their impact on how I handle myself as a mediator if I am 
honest with myself about this situation than if I deny this reality. 
Ironically, and I have heard this from many other mediators, the 
biggest challenge mediators may face to behaving in a fair way may be 
overcompensation for our less-than-impartial feelings.  That is, if I am 
more sympathetic to one party than to another and if I like that party 
more, I may overcompensate and go well out of my way to make sure 
the needs of the other party are addressed, thereby doing a disservice to 
the party I am sympathetic toward. 
We often talk about the perception of bias as opposed to its 
actuality.  Neutrality is as much about perception as anything else.  If we 
are perceived to be biased or non-neutral, then to a certain extent we 
are.  We are often more concerned about acting in a way that will not be 
perceived as biased than acting in a way that is actually not biased.  It is 
the perception that is key.  But of course, this is an ephemeral criterion.  
If disputants are unhappy about an outcome, then it is easy for them to 
assume the process and the mediator have been unfair in some way.  If 
we are overly concerned with this perception, we can be inhibited from 
acting in a responsible manner—for example, by helping people to 
articulate what their genuine choices are, fair or unfair though these 
may be.  However, if we do not pay attention to the potential that we 
will be perceived as partial in some way, we may not only undercut our 
effectiveness, but we may be ignoring one of the most important ways of 
evaluating our own approach. 
Neutrality as an aspiration may be the clearest and most meaningful 
way of understanding this concept.11  When we commit to impartiality, 
neutrality, or evenhandedness, we are essentially expressing an 
aspiration rather than a clearly definable commitment.  We are saying 
that our intentions are to be fair, to be evenhanded, and to act in a 
neutral manner without bias—whatever specific meaning we may give to 
those terms.  We can control the most egregious or obvious expressions 
 
11. See generally BERNARD S. MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT: A GUIDE TO 
ENGAGEMENT AND INTERVENTION (2012). 
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of bias or partiality, but we cannot offer complete neutrality both 
because the term itself is confusing and because it is impossible to 
adhere to a strict interpretation of neutrality, no matter which element 
we look at.  Nonetheless, neutrality as an aspiration is not meaningless, 
at least not in practice.  Clients expect us to be motivated, to act in a fair 
way, and to be attentive to the legitimate concerns of all parties.  Our 
commitment to trying to do just that is an important foundation of our 
connection with our clients.  That we cannot actually act in a way that 
completely actualizes this commitment does not make the aspiration to 
do so unimportant. 
III.  ARE WE VALUED FOR OUR NEUTRALITY? 
Conflict interveners often operate under the assumption that our 
neutrality is essential to why we are valued and why we are hired.12  But 
in the end, we are not hired to be neutral, impartial, fair, or unbiased, 
although people certainly do not want us to be unfair.  We are hired to 
help people engage in a constructive interaction, usually in the form of a 
negotiation.  Disputants want our help communicating; understanding 
each other; analyzing a conflict; articulating their concerns, ideas, and 
arguments in support of their proposals; developing options; evaluating 
options; and finding agreements where agreements are possible.  If we 
do this in a way that is effective and is perceived as competent and 
respectful to the disputants, we are fulfilling our most fundamental 
commitment.  Being neutral is not the core of what people are asking 
for—and it is a very culturally relative concept in any event.  In some 
contexts, being perceived as neutral is a necessary precondition to being 
utilized, but in many cultures someone who is neutral and disconnected 
to a conflict will not be viewed as an appropriate third party.13 
There is often an inconsistency between what clients genuinely want 
and what we offer.  Or put a different way, we assert that clients should 
rely on our services for reasons that are sometimes at odds with what 
clients are looking for.  We essentially say that disputants should come 
to us because we will offer an impartial, confidential service aimed at 
resolving disputes in an amicable and fair way.  We will do so by 
conducting a private and confidential communication process in which 
everyone will be given the opportunity to speak for themselves, decide 
 
12. MAYER 2004, supra note 6, at 29. 
13. See MOORE & WOODROW, supra note 10, at 419. 
11 - MAYER-11.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2012  9:00 PM 
2012] WHAT WE TALK ABOUT 865 
what is a wise course of action for each of them to follow, and arrive at 
integrative solutions that maximize the degree to which everyone’s 
needs are met.  Disputants, on the other hand, tend to want to be heard 
in a meaningful forum, to be acknowledged for the justice of their point 
of view and for what they have endured, to have their problems solved, 
to be labeled as honorable and reasonable, and to do this all in a socially 
legitimate and safe setting.14  These are not always contradictory 
approaches, but they often are.  We are in essence asking people to give 
up something very important to them, right at the outset of our work 
with them, and that is the potential to have their grievance heard in a 
powerful and socially sanctioned public forum.  Often this sacrifice is 
essential to motivating other parties to come to the table.  Parties agree 
to do this not because they see the great worth of our neutrality or 
communication skills but because the alternative paths they might take 
are fraught with other kinds of problems (cost, time, uncertainty, 
toxicity, and intimidation).  In this context, our assertion of our 
neutrality and our effectiveness at conducting problem-solving forums, 
while not necessarily at odds with what clients want, does not address 
what is most important to them. 
I am not saying that our commitment to confidentiality and fairness 
is not important; instead, I am saying that the focus on neutrality itself 
derives more from concerns that we articulate and perpetuate than from 
the essential needs or desires of our clients.  We are concerned about 
neutrality because it helps us identify who we are and distinguish 
ourselves from other interveners.  This identity and distinction is often 
more important to us than to our clients.  So why is it so important to 
us? 
IV.  NEUTRALITY AS A SOURCE OF IDENTITY 
I believe the debate about neutrality is in essence a discussion of 
identity.  This is why the debate between Susskind and Stulberg 
continues to be gripping.  The argument still has traction thirty years 
since it originally took place because it addresses our identity as a field 
and as professional conflict interveners, not because of its articulation of 
essential ethical dilemmas.  What Stulberg and Susskind have each 
identified, whether intentionally or not, is in essence a statement of who 
we are not.  We are not a field that can insure or even go very far to 
 
14. See generally MAYER 2004, supra note 6. 
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promote—at least directly—a fair, stable, efficient, and wise outcome 
(four criteria that Susskind proposed during the Marquette panel15) to 
disputes.  We can set up procedures, convene forums, set the tone, and 
facilitate a process that can allow such outcomes to develop as the 
circumstances and parties allow, but the effort to promote those kinds of 
outcomes cannot be the defining purpose and characteristic of our field.  
We simply do not have the power or the substantive expertise to 
produce or guarantee such outcomes.   
We are also not fundamentally neutral facilitators of a justice event, 
to use Stulberg’s formulation from the same panel.16  As I have 
discussed, neutrality is not our primary defining characteristic.  We are 
not completely or in some respects even significantly neutral, even as to 
the outcome (which is the type of neutrality that Stulberg emphasizes),17 
except in the aspirational sense.  And yet we do offer important services 
that people want and quite often need.  The core of what we offer is our 
most significant source of identity. 
As a field of practice, our professed identity has been partly 
borrowed, partly market-based, and often derived from defining criteria 
that are not completely convincing.  We have borrowed from law, 
counseling, negotiation, business, economics, international relations, 
labor relations, anthropology, sociology, theology, peace studies, and 
education.  There is nothing wrong with that.  In fact, that is one of our 
strengths.  Some borrowing is necessary for a field of practice to be 
relevant, and many fields borrow just as widely as we do—such as 
counseling, social work, and peace studies.  But the fact that we have not 
always or ever been clear about the essence or roots of our intellectual 
foundation accentuates the challenge of the identity discussion.  We are 
market-based in that we have defined our practice to a large extent from 
what the market for our services would support.  These defining criteria, 
as we have discussed, are often artificial or at least disconnected in some 
respects from what we actually do or are asked to do.  Our focuses on 
confidentiality, impartiality, the third-party neutral role, and reaching 
agreements seem to me to be tactics or stances we can take, but not 
essential defining characteristics of who we are. 
So it is not so hard to say what does not define us.  But what does?  
Or as we might say, if neutrality, mediation, confidentiality, and 
 
15. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 815. 
16. Id. at 810–11. 
17. Id. at 811. 
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resolution are our positions, what are our interests?  I suggest three 
different elements of identity that the Susskind–Stulberg18 debate has 
raised and that continue to give it traction: our fundamental purpose, 
our knowledge base, and the social impact of what we do. 
A.  Our Fundamental Purpose 
Conflict interveners have many different visions of their essential 
purpose.  For some, our raisons d’être are to resolve conflicts, to forge 
agreements, and to bring negotiations to effective conclusions.  For 
others, it is to promote a transformation of relationships and people, 
and for others some it is about building community and contributing to a 
more just world.  We have many different motivations for what we do 
and many approaches to how we accomplish the tasks that we have set 
for ourselves.  The work of a transformative mediator and the work of 
an evaluative mediator are so different that it is hard to understand 
them as being in the same field sometimes.19  What has seemed to hold 
these disparate approaches together is our understanding of our role as 
third-party neutrals who work with people in conflict.  So deconstructing 
the concept of neutrality—or challenging its ethical basis, as Susskind 
has done20—seems to attack the one unifying principle that has held us 
together.  But of course we always have been both more and less than a 
field of third-party neutrals.  For one thing, much of the most valuable 
work we have done has not occurred from a neutral stance but from 
what I have characterized as ally roles—as advisers, coaches, and 
advocates, for example.21  We have also functioned as system designers, 
administrators, trainers, evaluators, and in many other roles where we 
have not even purported to be third parties, much less neutral.  And, as 
we have seen, hanging too much of our identity on the commitment to 
neutrality is problematic because the concept itself is ambiguous. 
The Susskind–Stulberg interchange goes right at the question of 
fundamental purpose.  Susskind argues our purpose is to get fair, stable, 
 
18. I have intentionally changed the order of who I identify first in referring to the 
debate.  In the initial debate, Susskind wrote his article and Stulberg wrote the response.  See 
supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
19. For a rich presentation of different approaches to mediation in the family context, 
see DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS (Jay 
Folberg et al. eds., 2004). 
20. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 815.  Susskind argues that mediators should be 
fair, efficient, stable and wise, rather than neutral.  Id. 
21. MAYER 2004, supra note 6, at 222. 
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efficient, and wise agreements, and that purpose should govern 
whatever stance we take toward neutrality.22  Stulberg argues that our 
essential purpose is to provide “a systematic platform and framework 
for promoting not only self-determination but also personal 
responsibility.  It’s the chance to work something out, and not, as we so 
often want to do, let somebody else do it for us.”23  The debate here is 
not really about the wisdom, nature, or possibility of neutrality, but 
about fundamental purpose. 
I do not believe either formulation gets at the essential purpose that 
genuinely unites and defines the conflict intervention field because both 
still characterize that purpose in terms of a third-party role and the 
values and ethics implicit in that role.  In characterizing what our field is 
about, rather than trying to identify ourselves by the particular roles we 
play in conflict, we should focus on the purpose of our intervention.  As 
I see it, the defining purpose of our field, which I refer to as the conflict 
intervention field,24 is to help people deal with conflict productively and 
constructively—to assist people with constructive engagement in conflict 
or, when advisable, constructive avoidance of conflict.  We do this from 
many different stances, including the third-party stance, but we ought 
not to rely solely on a particular set of roles to define who we are.  And 
if we are not necessarily acting from a third-party role, we are certainly 
not always acting as neutrals, even in the aspirational sense.  We are 
informed by many values—including self-determination, social justice, 
and empowerment—but these too are not the essential defining features 
of our purpose (although they certainly guide us in how we pursue that 
purpose). 
B.  Our Knowledge Base 
Any attempt to define ourselves by what we do—by our 
methodologies, procedures, or systems of intervention—will inevitably 
run into the incredibly broad variety of approaches that we take.  This is 
true of psychotherapy, education, organizational development, 
architecture, law, and perhaps all disciplines with a strong practice 
component.  It is certainly true of conflict intervention.  But we can, 
perhaps, identify some elements of a common knowledge base that 
define our field.  While there are areas of particular knowledge we need 
 
22. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 819–21, 824. 
23. Draft of Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 5–6 (on file with law review). 
24. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 815. 
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depending on our particular role and area of expertise, as a field we can 
identify certain common areas of knowledge that we either have or 
should seek to have.  These common areas include conflict dynamics, 
negotiation, communication, power dynamics, cultural practices, systems 
theory, intervention processes, and intervention roles.25 
The meaning of neutrality as a commitment and an intervention tool 
has to be understood through the lens of these frameworks in order for 
us to really grasp its meaning for our work and our way of thinking.  For 
example, how does the entry of a third party who aspires to neutrality 
affect the dynamics of a conflict and how can this be explained through 
systems theory?  While we might be tempted to equate neutrality with 
the absence of power, this is of course not the case.  Taking a neutral 
stance can be a very powerful move.  By purporting not to have a desire 
to affect the outcome, we often position ourselves to have a very 
significant impact on what occurs.  This is ironic, perhaps, but not 
surprising.  Sometimes, the less power we try to obtain or to exert, the 
more we end up having. 
Stulberg and Susskind do not directly address our knowledge base, 
but their approaches have significant implications for what that 
knowledge base ought to be, none of which are contradictory to what I 
have indicated above.  However, each of their approaches suggests an 
emphasis on a somewhat different element of what we need to know.  
Susskind’s approach points to the importance of substantive knowledge 
(how else could we evaluate an agreement) and of familiarity with 
system and power dynamics.26  Stulberg’s argument underlines the 
importance of our knowledge of communication, negotiation, and 
process.27  I suspect that each would argue that all of the above are 
important, but I also suspect that in practice they would focus on those 
areas that are most conducive to carrying out the fundamental purpose 
of conflict intervention as they see it. 
C.  Our Social Impact 
Any field’s identity is wrapped up to some extent with what impact it 
has on society and on the larger social good.  Even purely abstract fields 
of endeavor, such as mathematics or philosophy, ultimately have to 
 
25. See MAYER 2004, supra note 6, at 292–93. 
26. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 808–09.  It would be impossible to establish a fair, 
efficient, stable, and wise outcome without being familiar with these issues.  
27. Stulberg, supra note 1, at 98–99. 
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contend with this question, and the conflict field certainly does as well.  
Our engagement with this question has been intensified by the works of 
writers such as Laura Nader,28 Tina Grillo,29 and Owen Fiss,30 who have 
directly suggested that the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
movement has had some very significant negative consequences.  Both 
Susskind and Stulberg are concerned about the impact of what we do, 
but come to different conclusions.  Susskind argues that, unless we 
directly commit to achieving socially desirable ends, both through the 
process we set up and through our attention to the agreements reached 
in those processes, we can easily become parties to socially undesirable 
or unjust results.31  For us to have the very positive social impact, which 
he clearly believes we have had and can have,32 we must travel outside 
the comfort zone of neutrality and address the wisdom of the outcome.  
For Stulberg, the very positive and powerful social impact we have had 
requires that we view mediation as a “justice event,” which requires us 
to be neutral about outcome.33 
I have written about this same issue as well, and I have argued that 
conflict intervention (and indeed all professions) is both an agent of 
social change and of social control.34  This is a defining feature of our 
existence as intellectual institutions.  We cannot escape this tension, but 
we can account for it and be conscious of it.  We can be alert, for 
 
28. Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and 
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 
3–10 (1993). 
29. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 
1545, 1549–50, 1605, 1610 (1991). 
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32. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 814–15.  Susskind argues that mediators, by 
constructing a good process, contribute to a good outcome, which he defines as one that is 
fair, efficient, stable, and wise.  Id. 
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example, to the possibility that our intervention, rather than being 
empowering, interferes with relatively weak parties getting access to 
sources of power that could genuinely help them meet their needs and 
that are realistically available to them.  If we find ourselves in such a 
situation, we may well decide not to continue.  Realistically, however, 
the calculation is never so straightforward.  People have to make choices 
about competing routes—about how much to emphasize a cooperative 
versus a competitive approach, for example—without knowing for sure 
what the implications of each will be over time.  And we cannot be sure 
either.  I have no doubt that there are cases that I have mediated in 
which one of the parties would have been better off in the long run had 
they chosen a more adversarial approach, although I cannot identify for 
sure which cases these are.  But I am also convinced that the cumulative 
effect of our work, particularly when we build in structural safeguards 
(e.g., screening for domestic violence) and when we are open with our 
clients about the pros and cons of entering into a particular process, is 
fundamentally empowering and supportive of social progress. 
Still, we always need to question this conviction as a field both 
because others have done so and because it is important for us not to 
take the social value of what we do for granted.  By debating the impact 
of what we do and by considering how our essential assumptions about 
who we are affect this impact, we accomplish two essential things.  First, 
we continue the process of professional-identity formation.  Second, we 
develop more sophisticated approaches to assessing the impact of our 
work.  This, I believe, is the essential contribution of the Susskind–
Stulberg interchange.  With this dialogue, they have provided us with an 
anchor and a framework for such a discussion, and they have also 
provided an impetus for us to continue engaging in it. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
On my very first day of orientation to social work school at 
Columbia University in 1968, the debate began about whether social 
work was a “band-aid” that essentially allowed fundamentally 
exploitative systems to continue or whether it was a genuine source of 
empowerment that promoted a more just and equal society.  This 
debate, while at times seeming trite and old, continues to this day and 
has been essential to the growth and identity formation of social work.  
And of course, social work is both.  In a sense, the debate about 
neutrality and the responsibility of the conflict intervener for insuring a 
just outcome is our analogy to this.  And we could almost use the same 
language and come to the same conclusion. 
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When we talk about neutrality, we are talking about who we are, 
what our purpose is, what our impact on the world is, and how we 
understand the work that we do.  In other words, we are talking about 
our identity.  I hope, however, that we do not let this discussion of 
neutrality become the primary driving force of the identity discussion 
that all fields need to have.  We are more than third-party conflict 
resolvers, and so, the neutrality discussion as a source of identity 
formation limits us.  I hope we can instead focus on the question of the 
purpose that motivates us when we intervene in conflict and the 
fundamental assets we bring to such intervention.  I think it is time to 
lay the Susskind and Stulberg debate to rest, or maybe we can dust it off 
every once in a while to see how we currently understand it.  I think it 
has served its purpose, and its time has gone.  We are not hung up about 
neutrality.  We are grappling with more fundamental issues.  That’s 
good.  I think Stulberg and Susskind would agree. 
 
